Reconciling Turkish Identity at a Transitional Moment

Published in Global Connections (Winter 2009)

I had the opportunity to travel to Turkey over the summer to participate in the Council on International Educational Exchange’s (CIEE) faculty development seminar, “Identity, Community, and Culture in Contemporary Turkey.” I went knowing that Turkey is experiencing significant changes, both in terms of its place within the international community and its political dynamics at the domestic level. As someone interested in the roles that regional powers play within their neighborhoods and the processes that lead to alterations in human rights behavior within states, I viewed the visit to Turkey as a tremendous opportunity to get an on-the-ground view of a country that represents both. What I found was that in addition to (and partially because of) these dynamics, Turkey is being forced to reconcile a number of conflictual points about its identity.

Perhaps no single moment captured my entire experience better than one that occurred during the evening that my friends and I sat in a hotel lobby watching the Turkish national football team play in the semi-final game of the European Cup. It was the furthest that Turkey had ever gone in this revered event. And now, Turkey was confronting the powerful German team. We were about a block away from Taksim Square (a central hub in Istanbul), where there was a massive crowd watching the match on enormous screens that were erected for the event. As we wandered around the square earlier, the excitement about this moment was unlike just about any other sporting experience I have had. The fact that Turkey had come this far held a real significance for the throngs that were flooding the area.

The “a-ha moment” came in the middle of the game though, when Turkey scored a goal. The crowd in the square absolutely erupted, and the cheers lasted for quite a while. But just as they finally died down, they were replaced by the call to prayer coming from the nearest mosque. This sacred melody was something that I had become accustomed to over the course of my stay. But this time was a bit different. It was just one of those moments in which everything that had been running around in my mind during this trip seemed to coalesce. The countervailing forces of secular and religious, modern and traditional, European and Islamic identities just seemed to blend together in a way that was harmonious and comfortable.

Throughout my experience, I was struck again and again by how much Turkey finds itself at a crossroads. Given its geographical placement at the intersection between “East and West” as well as “North and South,” this has always been the case, to some extent. But there is a tangible sense that one has in being there, that this is a country that is itself facing a crucial moment. Turkey seems to be filled with a sense of its own potential, but cognizant of its past failures to attain it. It is confronted with serious questions about how best to formulate policy to succeed in becoming an increasingly stable, prosperous, and influential state in the coming years. But along with these questions, something deeper is at stake. As the name of the seminar implied, there seems to be an important reflection period going on in which the very identity of Turkey is being evaluated. And this reflection is occurring in at least three important and interwoven areas: its modern-secular vs. traditional-Islamic orientation, its Middle Eastern vs. European regional placement, and its military-statist vs. liberal democratic operating political philosophy.

The first of these areas of introspection falls along a set of deep and sometimes conflicting identities. On the one hand, since its founding in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Republic of Turkey has been devoutly secular and committed to its inclusion within the community of modern states. There is no doubt that Ataturk wished to break the Turkish nation away from what he perceived as the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire, which included its being the standard bearer of the Islamic Caliphate. The reverence that Turks everywhere genuinely feel for their founding father and their commitment to his vision for their country is obvious. Ataturk’s face is ubiquitous in Turkey. We saw him in the form of his statues, portraits, and his face superimposed over the Turkish flag, just about anywhere we turned.

On the other hand, Turkey is the heart of what was the Ottoman Empire, and a society which is very much rooted in the Islamic faith. There is both a significance to the place and a sense of traditional identification that coexists along with its modern side. I felt this each time I visited a mosque, shrine, or a building that marked the legacy of Ottoman times. I heard this when we spoke to people about the important place that Dervish orders hold in traditional Turkish society. I saw this in the wide range of styles of clothing that I saw particularly women wearing on the streets. Finally, I understood the scope of this identification of Turks by the election of the AKP (an Islamic party) as the governing party of Turkey.

While it is an all-too-common perception in the West that these identities are in pure conflict, it is not entirely clear that they are in Turkey. Is there a tenuous balance between its modern-secular and its traditional-Islamic side? Absolutely. It is this delicate balance that makes the ongoing debate that many of us have heard about over whether or not women should be allowed to wear head scarves on university campuses so volatile. It is this fear that drives many committed to a modern Turkey to vehemently oppose the reintroduction of such symbols of the past. But I must admit that a balance does seem possible when one views it first hand. In fact, it is this delicate balancing act that could prove to be a positive model for other states in which Islamic resurgence is occurring.

This was clear when we met with Haluk Ozdalga, a Minister of Parliament, the Chairman of the Turkish Parliament’s Environment Commission, and a member of the AKP. While a common assumption here might be that an Islamic party would shun the “West” and attempt to cordon off Turkey from Europe, the opposite is true. MP Ozdalga insisted that the environmental improvements that he is leading, and the numerous other changes that Turkey is attempting to make to achieve membership in the European Union are absolutely essential. He believes that EU membership is critical to ensuring that democracy is protected from future returns to the military’s practice of cracking down when it seems to be losing its firm grip on the state, it is essential for the long-term economic and political stability of the Republic, and it is important for Turkey’s maintenance of its critical position within the Transatlantic Community. We asked him how his party reconciled this pro-European position with the accusations that have been made that it was attempting to press an Islamist agenda upon Turkey. His response was quick and firm. “It is an absurd idea that Turkey could ever be a religious state. It has never been in history, and it will never be.”

His words and tone seemed to echo those of so many individuals with whom I came into contact with there. And the thought that I kept coming back to was this. Is this so different from what many democratic societies like our own deal with? The idea that religious identification of individuals is somehow sufficient to be a direct challenge to democracy does not ring true in the United States. Why should it necessarily in Turkey? That Turkey is struggling to find the delicate balance between this set of identities is clear, but so is the fact that such a balance can in fact be struck. Further, the appreciation of the importance of such a balance is a positive sign.

One of the central areas of promise for Turkey in the coming years is its potential for an increasingly prominent role within its several neighboring regions. This issue gives rise to the second key area of Turkey’s introspection. The question of where one should classify Turkey’s geographical and cultural placement is one that dates back over a long period of history. It is also one that is taking on an entirely new resonance as international security dynamics seem to be playing out more and more along regional lines, where certain states (regional powers) have an increasing level of influence. Turkey is a regional power in the Middle East already. It is one of the largest military and economic powers in the region, and it plays a critical function in the management of security issues there. This can be seen recently in its mediation of negotiations between Israel and Syria. It was also apparent in its denial of U.S. forces access to Turkish territory on their way to invade Iraq. But its potential as a regional power does not end with the Middle East. Rather, it holds just such a position within at least two other regions: Central Asia and Europe. Whether or not it provides a sort of push back to the increasing power of Russia within Central Asia is a matter that will determined over a longer period, and will depend on many different factors.

Europe, on the other hand, is very much the focus of some of the most important discussions in Turkey today. Turkey began formal discussions with the European Union on accession as a new member in 2005. It may be common in the U.S. and Western Europe to view Turkey as being situated inside or on the border of the Middle East. But Professor Sevilay Kahraman of the Middle East Technical University told us, “We perceive ourselves as part of the European society - at least since the 19th Century.” She pointed out that at least since it joined NATO, it has been a part of the European security community. The bid for EU membership then, is a way of formalizing its more complete membership within the community that it perceives itself to be a part of. Rather than erasing its identification with other regions though, this is yet another example of the complexity of the Turkish identity.

The Turkish government has taken concerted steps to bring various practices and policies in line with the requirements for EU membership. While it has made significant strides, it clearly has much further to go. Its long-standing conflict over the status of Cyprus (already an EU member), its legacy of human rights abuses, and the powerful role of the military in its government are some of the key stumbling blocks that Turkey has some level of control over. The necessary transformations for EU membership require that Turkey reconcile its geographical place as a European or Middle Eastern state, or some combination thereof. They also necessitate a confrontation with the third area of reflection that it is currently undergoing - that is, what sort of operating political philosophy guides its government. Is it a liberal democracy that values liberty and human rights in the interest of the individual Turkish citizen; or is it a semi-democratic system whose military holds the real power and imposes order when and how it sees fit in the interest of the state? The answer to this question is an essential step toward the EU.

While one cannot possibly underestimate the critical importance of the Cyprus issue, this topic occupied less attention in my discussions in Turkey than others. The role of the military within the government however, was at the forefront of many people’s minds. The AKP was facing the judicial branch this summer on charges that it had violated the Constitution’s establishment of a secular Turkey by moving to allow headscarves on university campuses. This was widely perceived as what was commonly referred to as a “judicial coup.” Instead of overthrowing the government with force, the military was attempting to remove the AKP through legal means.

What was striking was the nearly uniform opposition that we heard to this move, even from those not generally in support of the AKP. It was viewed as threatening to the democratic future of the country. Most of the speculation that was occurring while I was in Turkey was over what the AKP would do if the court ruled against it, or whether the military would accept a ruling in favor of the governing party. The military after all, has a long legacy of overthrowing governments it opposes. But as Professor Elisabeth Ozdalga of the Middle East Technical University told us, there is a sense that the Turkish economy is too integrated with the international community for the military to resort to its old practices. In the end, the AKP was fined but not banned, and the military has indeed not taken any overt action against the government. One could view this as a source of optimism for Turkey’s accession hopes, as well as for the political future of Turkey more generally.

Aside from the military’s general role in government, long-standing human rights practices stand in the way of Turkey being a liberal-democratic, European state. Thus, past and present human rights were the subject of many conversations we had. We met with Dr. Levent Korkut, Director of Amnesty International, Turkey, who cited significant improvements in recent years. The Kurds have been afforded more freedom of cultural and linguistic expression, most heavy forms of torture have been banned, Turkey has ratified all international human rights treaties, and submitted itself to being subject to the European Court of Human Rights. On the other hand, he points out that a number of minorities continue to lack protections against curtailments of their freedoms, laws continue to exist and are enforced that grossly limit freedom of expression, and the Kurds specifically continue to be repressed. Dr. Korkut argues that the Turkish people have never had the opportunity to participate in the construction or selection of a national constitution, and believes that such an exercise, which includes the development of minority protections, is a critical step for the political development of Turkey.

It is likely that such a process would force Turkey to confront not only its contemporary human rights problems, but also those of the past. From the killing of over 200,000 Greeks and the forced displacement of around 1.25 million more from Turkey, to the systematic extermination of as many as 2 million Armenians, Turkey’s early history is stained with violence on a massive scale. Given the fact that people can be prosecuted and have their livelihoods wrecked for insulting “Turkishness”, these are topics that are very difficult to discuss with Turks. And yet, such an honest confrontation with its past would seem to be critical to Turkey’s internal as well as external reconciliation. This step has not happened yet. But we heard indications that it is beginning, including particular attention to the atrocities that were committed against Greeks in the 1922 Smyrna (now Izmir) Massacre. That Turkey’s human rights record and practices require further reconciliation and that this necessitates a confrontation with exactly who the Turkish state is is undeniable. So is the fact that it is gradually doing so in a fairly profound way.

Turkey stands at a unique moment of transition in which there is a great deal of promise. It is emerging upon the international stage with a potential level of influence that it has not enjoyed in centuries. It is engaged in a process that could lead to its finally being recognized as a European peer at a level that has eluded Ottoman and Turkish leaders for a very long time. Such recognition would confirm an important part of the Turks’ self-identity. It would provide validation for the potential coexistence of Islamic society and the modern, secular state. And it would mean the attainment of the democratic promise that has been made to the Turkish people for roughly a century. It is an exciting moment. With continued Turkish perseverance, and openness on the part of Europe, Turkey may just find a balance to its complex and rich set of identities and as a result, attain its tremendous potential.