In the first debate between the contending nominees for the U.S. presidency, Senator John McCain repeatedly chided Senator Barack Obama for immediately urging restraint between both Russia and Georgia during the August military conflict. That Senator Obama also criticized the Kremlin's heavy handed treatment of Georgia in this crisis seemed to be irrelevant given that he had made the cardinal error of calling for a tamping down of violence on both sides. This condemnation of such a plea has motivated me to write this response for two reasons.
First, the fact that we have reached a point at which calls for restraint are met with ridicule is indicative of the twilight zone-like perspective that the U.S. leadership and much of our society has come to accept as reasonable. It is one that lacks understanding or empathy for any perspective than its own. It is one that views the world in sharp dichotomies that automatically place the whims of the U.S. in the category of right, and all others as wrong, or even evil. It is one that forgets that other states (much like the United States) have their own national interests, which they pursue in ways that sometimes conflict with the immediate interests of the U.S. Mainly, it is a perspective that is extreme in its orientation, and is quite dangerous.
Second, it is specifically representative of an alarming downward trajectory in U.S.-Russian relations that result in many respects from the lack of respect that has been shown to Russia as a fellow Great Power over the past two American administrations. This trend is both predictable and manageable. But the United States must begin to come to terms with the fact that Russia is a Great Power, with interests of its own. Some of these interests will provide convenient overlaps with those of the U.S. and its Western allies. In such cases, cooperation should be cultivated. When such overlaps do not exist, the U.S. and its allies should be both resolute and respectful. These two positions are not mutually exclusive - though they seem to be framed as such by hardline elements within the U.S. government. They are rather, diplomacy.
This essay then, seeks to make several points. First, the recent actions of Russia are regrettable, but predictable. They represent what one should expect of a Great Power, given the contemporary strength and behavior of other Great Powers (and particularly that of the United States). They also reflect what one should expect of a Regional Power who has no real regional rival and a history of regional dominance. Second, the post-Cold War and recent policies toward Russia have contributed substantially to Russia's desire to reassert itself within the "near abroad." Third, this is a relationship that can still be managed successfully. However, we must recognize that there will be differences of interest, that in cases that do not threaten core American interests, we will need to give Russia some latitude for action, that we are not entering into a new Cold War, and that there will remain opportunities for cooperation. Finally, the general orientation that is reflected in these points should also guide U.S. policies toward other states, and particularly Great and Regional Powers.
With respect to the first point, the treatment of Georgia by the Russian military in the recent past is certainly to be criticized. Russia was, in its typical fashion, too heavy handed. There was not a need for this, and the rationale used by the Kremlin that claimed an ongoing "cultural genocide" was quite frankly, absurd. That being said, the general actions themselves should not be surprising. Essentially, they reflect two simultaneous and overlapping games that are being played. First, they represent the ongoing reassertion of a Great Power into the global system, given its own recent growth in relative power, the shrinking of (or at least the over-burdened pressures upon) that of United States, and the long-term dynamics between these and other Great Power states. Second, they reflect the assertion of a Regional Power into the unipolar post-Soviet space in a manner that is historically normal, that is consistent with the behavior of other (though not all) Regional Powers within similar contexts, and which was in response to a direct challenge to its commanding position within its region.
Buoyed by petrodollars and the political and economic stabilization that for a time eluded Russia after the end of the Cold War, the Russian government is in a position to once again exert itself back onto the global stage on its own terms. Driven by a resurgence of nationalism and confidence under the leadership of Prime Minister Putin, Russia is in a position that is more reflective of its international role over the past several centuries than either its Superpower status during the Cold War or its subservient position after have been. At the same time, the power and credibility of the United States appears to be in dramatic recession. Its military capacity is stretched to the point at which it lacks a commanding global position to assertively address secondary interests. Its credibility as a leader of a liberal international order has been crippled by its brazen disregard for many of the rules that it has been central in creating: from its unilateral and preventive invasion of Iraq, to its disregard and disdain for the international human rights regime, to its unwillingness to actively address shared international problems such as global climate change. This is combined with the ongoing lack of a willingness by the European powers to take a real politico-military leadership role in international affairs, and the lack of core interests on the part of other Great Powers (China and Japan) in this particular geographical area. It is unsurprising that Russia would take Georgia's bid for the imposition of military control over the autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (areas in which Russia has serious interests, large numbers of citizens, and peacekeeping troops) as an opportunity to flex its muscles.
As a Regional Power within a geographic space that lacks any competitor, it is also unsurprising that Russia would assert its command over other states. Since the recession of the power of the Ottoman Empire within this region, Russia has not been confronted with a peer competitor for leadership in the region. While the formal Soviet Empire may have disappeared, one should not anticipate that so will substantial Russian influence. Nor should one interpret this commanding presence as the reformulation of the Russian or Soviet Empire. This is a behavioral pattern that is consistent with other Regional Powers who lack geographic peers. Through the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and the Roosevelt Corollary addendum in 1904, the U.S. has claimed the Western Hemisphere as its domain to actively impose its interests. In states that include Colombia, Guatemala, Chile, Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico, Haiti, Grenada, and Cuba, the U.S. has intervened with force (covertly or through the overt use of its military) to ensure that its interests are not severely undercut. The North/Central American region in fact, is the most clear-cut case of single state domination that exists in the world today. That Russia would opt to pursue similar methods in regions that represent her core national interests is not simply unsurprising - it is fairly "normal."
The second general point that should be made is that the reassertion of Russian power within its own region is the logical result of the disregard that its interests have been treated with since the end of the Cold War. As Dmitri Simes argues, the American mythology that Ronald Reagan single-handedly (or even primarily) won the Cold War is not only a mischaracterization of this momentous historical event. It is also the root of the U.S. and allies' treatment of Russia as a vanquished enemy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not the point of this essay to go into the wrong-headedness of this common American belief. My concern here is the result, which has been the alienation and humiliation of Russia during the period in which its relative power reached a low point.
In pressing for a radical "shock treatment" to Russia's economy during the 1990s, targeted at bringing it in line with a more pure free market system, the Clinton Administration and its Western partners took a condescending posture toward a state that has been and would again be its peer. The effect of these economic reforms were severe, created a great deal of hardship, and were policies that the Western powers never have and never would adhere to themselves. The expansion of NATO membership (even extending its promise to former Soviet states in the Baltics), the unauthorized military intervention into Kosovo, the beginning of the ongoing push to promote an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea that avoids Russian territory, and the general impression of eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Community's membership and interests with less than sincere concern for what this meant for Russia all demonstrated a high level of disrespect.
Under the Bush administration, this perception of insult has only been compounded. Immediately upon entering office, President Bush unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, calling it a relic (which in no way characterized the Russian view of this agreement). The current administration has pushed for the further expansion of NATO to include the accession of Ukraine and Georgia. It has actively supported the Georgian government's oppositional posture toward Moscow under questionable assertions of its democratic character. It has unwaveringly determined that its National Missile Defense system will be partially based in Poland and the Czech Republic. It disregarded Russia's and the international community's more broadly, opposition to its unilateral invasion of Iraq. It has dragged out negotiations on the inclusion of Russia in the WTO to the point at which such promises seem disingenuous. And it actively supported Kosovar independence from Serbia. That some of these post-Cold War policies may be defended on the grounds that they further U.S. national interests and/or international stability is plausible. What is important for the purposes of the argument here is that each of them has further alienated and insulted Russia as a fellow Great Power.
Both administrations, in other words, consistently demonstrated a lack of restraint in their treatment of a Russia with diminished power. Thus, it is unsurprising that given the opportunity, Russia would assert itself in its own region. Other powers are both incapable and unwilling to deter it. While the West can cry foul all it wants, Russia is not going to be deterred by threats of punitive actions that involve a lack of incorporation into Western institutions. It is already convinced that it is not a real partner with the West. And this is partly thanks to the consistent signals that the West has sent to Russia that have supported such a view. The die is, as they say, cast.
The way to handle this relationship now is not to completely bow to Russia's will. When Russian actions are too extreme or conflict with the interests of the Western alliance, it should be dealt with firmly and with clarity. It should be made clear to Russia which interests are core to the Western allies, and cannot be transgressed. The United States is still the dominant military power in the world, and it stands atop a set of alliances and an international order that does not allow for complete degrees of freedom for Russian actions. Nor would it be in Russia's interest to completely alienate itself from this order or from these states. This must be done though, with a demonstration of respect to Russia as a peer, in a manner that considers its own perspective as one to be negotiated with rather than consistently condemned or disregarded, to demonstrate moderation, and yes - restraint.
Nor must the U.S. and allies sacrifice their interests in promoting democratic governance and increased economic openness throughout Eurasia and beyond. These interests increase the security of not only alliance members, but also the international community more broadly. The way to do this though, is through engagement rather than alienation, inducement rather than insult, and most certainly, example rather than decree. Additionally, this sort of enlargement of the liberal order strategy must be done in a measured way that takes into consideration the perceptions of states like Russia, who interpret such moves as strategies of encirclement and neo-containment. Wild, from-the-gut rhetoric that is derisive of restraint is a catalyst, not a remedy for Russian belligerent nationalism. One could in fact argue that it represents a dangerous appeal to American belligerent nationalism.
In addition to dealing with Russia and its neighbors with a heightened degree of prudence, the United States must make concerted efforts to rectify the untold damage to the relationships that have been the bedrock of American foreign policy in the post-World War II era as well as to its legitimacy as a global leader of a liberal order. While these are subjects for a whole separate essay, they are critical to the future of relations between Russia and the West. It is NATO that will be the most important bulwark against Russian hostility in the future. The United States must act proactively to nurture the all-important relationships that make up this alliance. It cannot simply expect that the European powers will simply fall into line when Washington demands. The time to remedy this situation is now, and the means through which to do so are through a less militaristic and hawkish tone. European powers, like Russia, should be accorded the respect that they deserve as partners, not subordinates. Additionally, the U.S. needs to practice what it preaches. If it wishes to continue to utilize the liberal order that it has actively expanded since the Second World War, and which has widened international security, it must begin to play by its own rules. It is for instance, laughable to hear Vice-President Cheney go to Ukraine and criticize Russia's increasingly repressive regime. He is in no position. And this fact is not lost on the rest of the world.
Finally, the contours of the revised approach that I propose here for U.S. relations with Russia are applicable beyond. The United States must begin to treat other Great Powers with the respect that they deserve if it hopes to elicit their cooperation in dealing with many of the common problems that we face: from international terrorism to nuclear proliferation to global climate change. It must also recognize that the world is now structured in a way that requires increasingly cooperative relationships with Regional Powers who often have a greater interest in and influence upon addressing economic and security problems that arise within their neighborhoods. Even when dealing with smaller states, over whom Washington has a greater degree of leverage, it would do well to be more measured than it has become. Rather than ridiculing calls for restraint, the United States should encourage others to show it. More than this, the U.S. must incorporate a higher degree of restraint in its own behavior if it hopes to pursue its national interests successfully.
First, the fact that we have reached a point at which calls for restraint are met with ridicule is indicative of the twilight zone-like perspective that the U.S. leadership and much of our society has come to accept as reasonable. It is one that lacks understanding or empathy for any perspective than its own. It is one that views the world in sharp dichotomies that automatically place the whims of the U.S. in the category of right, and all others as wrong, or even evil. It is one that forgets that other states (much like the United States) have their own national interests, which they pursue in ways that sometimes conflict with the immediate interests of the U.S. Mainly, it is a perspective that is extreme in its orientation, and is quite dangerous.
Second, it is specifically representative of an alarming downward trajectory in U.S.-Russian relations that result in many respects from the lack of respect that has been shown to Russia as a fellow Great Power over the past two American administrations. This trend is both predictable and manageable. But the United States must begin to come to terms with the fact that Russia is a Great Power, with interests of its own. Some of these interests will provide convenient overlaps with those of the U.S. and its Western allies. In such cases, cooperation should be cultivated. When such overlaps do not exist, the U.S. and its allies should be both resolute and respectful. These two positions are not mutually exclusive - though they seem to be framed as such by hardline elements within the U.S. government. They are rather, diplomacy.
This essay then, seeks to make several points. First, the recent actions of Russia are regrettable, but predictable. They represent what one should expect of a Great Power, given the contemporary strength and behavior of other Great Powers (and particularly that of the United States). They also reflect what one should expect of a Regional Power who has no real regional rival and a history of regional dominance. Second, the post-Cold War and recent policies toward Russia have contributed substantially to Russia's desire to reassert itself within the "near abroad." Third, this is a relationship that can still be managed successfully. However, we must recognize that there will be differences of interest, that in cases that do not threaten core American interests, we will need to give Russia some latitude for action, that we are not entering into a new Cold War, and that there will remain opportunities for cooperation. Finally, the general orientation that is reflected in these points should also guide U.S. policies toward other states, and particularly Great and Regional Powers.
With respect to the first point, the treatment of Georgia by the Russian military in the recent past is certainly to be criticized. Russia was, in its typical fashion, too heavy handed. There was not a need for this, and the rationale used by the Kremlin that claimed an ongoing "cultural genocide" was quite frankly, absurd. That being said, the general actions themselves should not be surprising. Essentially, they reflect two simultaneous and overlapping games that are being played. First, they represent the ongoing reassertion of a Great Power into the global system, given its own recent growth in relative power, the shrinking of (or at least the over-burdened pressures upon) that of United States, and the long-term dynamics between these and other Great Power states. Second, they reflect the assertion of a Regional Power into the unipolar post-Soviet space in a manner that is historically normal, that is consistent with the behavior of other (though not all) Regional Powers within similar contexts, and which was in response to a direct challenge to its commanding position within its region.
Buoyed by petrodollars and the political and economic stabilization that for a time eluded Russia after the end of the Cold War, the Russian government is in a position to once again exert itself back onto the global stage on its own terms. Driven by a resurgence of nationalism and confidence under the leadership of Prime Minister Putin, Russia is in a position that is more reflective of its international role over the past several centuries than either its Superpower status during the Cold War or its subservient position after have been. At the same time, the power and credibility of the United States appears to be in dramatic recession. Its military capacity is stretched to the point at which it lacks a commanding global position to assertively address secondary interests. Its credibility as a leader of a liberal international order has been crippled by its brazen disregard for many of the rules that it has been central in creating: from its unilateral and preventive invasion of Iraq, to its disregard and disdain for the international human rights regime, to its unwillingness to actively address shared international problems such as global climate change. This is combined with the ongoing lack of a willingness by the European powers to take a real politico-military leadership role in international affairs, and the lack of core interests on the part of other Great Powers (China and Japan) in this particular geographical area. It is unsurprising that Russia would take Georgia's bid for the imposition of military control over the autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (areas in which Russia has serious interests, large numbers of citizens, and peacekeeping troops) as an opportunity to flex its muscles.
As a Regional Power within a geographic space that lacks any competitor, it is also unsurprising that Russia would assert its command over other states. Since the recession of the power of the Ottoman Empire within this region, Russia has not been confronted with a peer competitor for leadership in the region. While the formal Soviet Empire may have disappeared, one should not anticipate that so will substantial Russian influence. Nor should one interpret this commanding presence as the reformulation of the Russian or Soviet Empire. This is a behavioral pattern that is consistent with other Regional Powers who lack geographic peers. Through the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and the Roosevelt Corollary addendum in 1904, the U.S. has claimed the Western Hemisphere as its domain to actively impose its interests. In states that include Colombia, Guatemala, Chile, Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico, Haiti, Grenada, and Cuba, the U.S. has intervened with force (covertly or through the overt use of its military) to ensure that its interests are not severely undercut. The North/Central American region in fact, is the most clear-cut case of single state domination that exists in the world today. That Russia would opt to pursue similar methods in regions that represent her core national interests is not simply unsurprising - it is fairly "normal."
The second general point that should be made is that the reassertion of Russian power within its own region is the logical result of the disregard that its interests have been treated with since the end of the Cold War. As Dmitri Simes argues, the American mythology that Ronald Reagan single-handedly (or even primarily) won the Cold War is not only a mischaracterization of this momentous historical event. It is also the root of the U.S. and allies' treatment of Russia as a vanquished enemy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not the point of this essay to go into the wrong-headedness of this common American belief. My concern here is the result, which has been the alienation and humiliation of Russia during the period in which its relative power reached a low point.
In pressing for a radical "shock treatment" to Russia's economy during the 1990s, targeted at bringing it in line with a more pure free market system, the Clinton Administration and its Western partners took a condescending posture toward a state that has been and would again be its peer. The effect of these economic reforms were severe, created a great deal of hardship, and were policies that the Western powers never have and never would adhere to themselves. The expansion of NATO membership (even extending its promise to former Soviet states in the Baltics), the unauthorized military intervention into Kosovo, the beginning of the ongoing push to promote an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea that avoids Russian territory, and the general impression of eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Community's membership and interests with less than sincere concern for what this meant for Russia all demonstrated a high level of disrespect.
Under the Bush administration, this perception of insult has only been compounded. Immediately upon entering office, President Bush unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, calling it a relic (which in no way characterized the Russian view of this agreement). The current administration has pushed for the further expansion of NATO to include the accession of Ukraine and Georgia. It has actively supported the Georgian government's oppositional posture toward Moscow under questionable assertions of its democratic character. It has unwaveringly determined that its National Missile Defense system will be partially based in Poland and the Czech Republic. It disregarded Russia's and the international community's more broadly, opposition to its unilateral invasion of Iraq. It has dragged out negotiations on the inclusion of Russia in the WTO to the point at which such promises seem disingenuous. And it actively supported Kosovar independence from Serbia. That some of these post-Cold War policies may be defended on the grounds that they further U.S. national interests and/or international stability is plausible. What is important for the purposes of the argument here is that each of them has further alienated and insulted Russia as a fellow Great Power.
Both administrations, in other words, consistently demonstrated a lack of restraint in their treatment of a Russia with diminished power. Thus, it is unsurprising that given the opportunity, Russia would assert itself in its own region. Other powers are both incapable and unwilling to deter it. While the West can cry foul all it wants, Russia is not going to be deterred by threats of punitive actions that involve a lack of incorporation into Western institutions. It is already convinced that it is not a real partner with the West. And this is partly thanks to the consistent signals that the West has sent to Russia that have supported such a view. The die is, as they say, cast.
The way to handle this relationship now is not to completely bow to Russia's will. When Russian actions are too extreme or conflict with the interests of the Western alliance, it should be dealt with firmly and with clarity. It should be made clear to Russia which interests are core to the Western allies, and cannot be transgressed. The United States is still the dominant military power in the world, and it stands atop a set of alliances and an international order that does not allow for complete degrees of freedom for Russian actions. Nor would it be in Russia's interest to completely alienate itself from this order or from these states. This must be done though, with a demonstration of respect to Russia as a peer, in a manner that considers its own perspective as one to be negotiated with rather than consistently condemned or disregarded, to demonstrate moderation, and yes - restraint.
Nor must the U.S. and allies sacrifice their interests in promoting democratic governance and increased economic openness throughout Eurasia and beyond. These interests increase the security of not only alliance members, but also the international community more broadly. The way to do this though, is through engagement rather than alienation, inducement rather than insult, and most certainly, example rather than decree. Additionally, this sort of enlargement of the liberal order strategy must be done in a measured way that takes into consideration the perceptions of states like Russia, who interpret such moves as strategies of encirclement and neo-containment. Wild, from-the-gut rhetoric that is derisive of restraint is a catalyst, not a remedy for Russian belligerent nationalism. One could in fact argue that it represents a dangerous appeal to American belligerent nationalism.
In addition to dealing with Russia and its neighbors with a heightened degree of prudence, the United States must make concerted efforts to rectify the untold damage to the relationships that have been the bedrock of American foreign policy in the post-World War II era as well as to its legitimacy as a global leader of a liberal order. While these are subjects for a whole separate essay, they are critical to the future of relations between Russia and the West. It is NATO that will be the most important bulwark against Russian hostility in the future. The United States must act proactively to nurture the all-important relationships that make up this alliance. It cannot simply expect that the European powers will simply fall into line when Washington demands. The time to remedy this situation is now, and the means through which to do so are through a less militaristic and hawkish tone. European powers, like Russia, should be accorded the respect that they deserve as partners, not subordinates. Additionally, the U.S. needs to practice what it preaches. If it wishes to continue to utilize the liberal order that it has actively expanded since the Second World War, and which has widened international security, it must begin to play by its own rules. It is for instance, laughable to hear Vice-President Cheney go to Ukraine and criticize Russia's increasingly repressive regime. He is in no position. And this fact is not lost on the rest of the world.
Finally, the contours of the revised approach that I propose here for U.S. relations with Russia are applicable beyond. The United States must begin to treat other Great Powers with the respect that they deserve if it hopes to elicit their cooperation in dealing with many of the common problems that we face: from international terrorism to nuclear proliferation to global climate change. It must also recognize that the world is now structured in a way that requires increasingly cooperative relationships with Regional Powers who often have a greater interest in and influence upon addressing economic and security problems that arise within their neighborhoods. Even when dealing with smaller states, over whom Washington has a greater degree of leverage, it would do well to be more measured than it has become. Rather than ridiculing calls for restraint, the United States should encourage others to show it. More than this, the U.S. must incorporate a higher degree of restraint in its own behavior if it hopes to pursue its national interests successfully.
