On Security - Part I: Establishing the Inquiry

One of the subjects that I find particularly fascinating and pertinent to one's practical understanding of world politics, as well as critically important to our understanding of how the reality of our political world and its discourse are shaped, is how we conceptualize security. This is a subject about which my thinking continues to evolve, and which will likely be an issue that is returned to with some regularity in this blog.

Realists like Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer tell us that security is the central interest of the state. Others like Hans Morgenthau tell us that the central interest of the state is power. But even though this derives from human nature for Morgenthau, one finds in the different variations on realism the clear function that power serves - increasing the state's security. While the discussion about what is actually the central interest of the state is an interesting one, it is not the one that I focus on here. Rather, my focus is on what security is, and whose security this concept refers to.

Given realism's long-standing position as the dominant theoretical approach to international security, the answer to this question is fairly straight-forward. Security refers to National Security, or the physical safety of the state from military attack by another state (or perhaps non-state actors in the contemporary context). One can see the practical implications of this foundational conceptualization in the recent discourse about human rights practices within the context of the Global War on Terrorism. The idea that human rights standards must be waived or circumvented in the interest of national security reflects a value-ordering and an assumption about what security is and whose is most important.

Setting aside for the time being the claims about the tactical effectiveness of torture as a means for eliciting useful information in the so-called "ticking time bomb scenario" (a dubious argument, which distorts the evidence of the effectiveness of this technique as well as obscures its real purpose), the importance here is that the argument is based upon the assumption that the security of the state is of greater importance than that of the individual.

Perhaps this is true. But this is a position that merits debate, rather than one that can be assumed. Additionally, if one is to accept this proposition, one should also understand that this conclusion is the result of a successful process of what Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde refer to in Security: A New Framework for Analysis as securitization. Securitization is the process through which something or someone is framed as an existential threat, which justifies extraordinary measures by the threatened party.

If you are interested, you can view some commentary by Barry Buzan on the concept of securitization in an interview that he recently gave.

That the security of the state is paramount, and that it is defined in terms of traditional military threats would seem to make sense too, given that one can look over the course of history and find loss of life on a grand scale within the context of interstate warfare. Consider for instance, the tens (even hundreds) of millions of lives lost during the Twentieth Century in wars between states. Given that predatory states exist in the world, and seek to expand their power at the expense of others, we may in fact need to reify the security of the state over our own as a means of achieving our own individual security. After all, we cannot protect ourselves from such threats. The state is the only actor with such capacity.

But what if the state is the single largest threat to our individual security? Then what happens to the justification for reifying national security over our own? In fact, R. J. Rummel finds in Death by Government that four times as many people were killed during the Twentieth Century in cases of what he calls democide by their own states than in organized warfare between states. And this figure actually under-estimates the deaths at the hands of one's own government to a significant degree, given that it is restricted to only one type of state violence. It therefore misses many people killed by their governments, but outside of the context of systematic mass murders.

It seems to me then, that we have at least two reasons to consider the basic assumption that state security must be prioritized over that of the individual suspect. First, the justification above is actually based upon a philosophical premise that the importance of state security rests on its duty and ability to protect that of individuals. Thus, it is actually individual security that should be considered supreme, and state security considered to be a means toward achieving that end. Second, there is empirical evidence that the state - in many cases - does not in fact satisfy this duty (or perhaps in cases of failed states, cannot). In fact, it appears to be the single largest threat to the security of its people. Therefore, one is compelled to question the validity of assuming up front that the security of the state should always be considered ahead of the security of other actors.

The purpose here is not to provide an exhaustive argument against the importance of state security. In fact, I would not even agree with such an general argument. Rather, it is to suggest that our understanding of security should be much broader than it traditionally has been. At very least, the points made above provide a starting point for a parallel concern with the value of individual, or human security. Arguments that are premised upon the unquestioned supremacy of state security should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism.

Nor do I claim that these ideas are entirely novel. They are shaped by a number of important scholars. Particularly prominant here are those that have already been mentioned as well as my recent reading of Bill McSweeney's Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations.

American University of Sharjah Information

(Photograph found at http://www.america.gov/)

One of the functions of this blog will be to write about my experiences with life in the United Arab Emirates. I will be joining the Department of International Studies at the American University of Sharjah in August of this year.

The move is an exciting one - both professionally and personally. I know that the perspective that I will gain from living in the UAE will assist me in better understanding the subjects that I am researching and teaching about. It will also be a real opportunity for my family and me, which will introduce us to a society with which we do not have extensive experience, and will open our minds to ways of life and thinking that will make us all more informed and well-rounded people.

I am posting some links here for those who are interested in finding out more about where we will be located.

Here is a link to a couple of promotional videos that AUS has created:

http://www.aus.edu/video/

Here is the main link to the university's web site:

http://www.aus.edu/

Here is the link to the Department of International Studies:

http://www.aus.edu/cas/is/

Contemporary Slavery

There is a common perception that slavery is a thing of the past. The word conjures images of the antebellum American South - a stain on the American conscience, and its "original sin." But this is what the American Civil War was fought to end. And numerous international treaties have banned the practice in very clear terms. Thus, it is something to study as a historical phenomenon.

Most students and others with whom I speak find it exceedingly surprising then, that there are an estimated 27 million people living in bondage around the world today. Between 700,000 and 2 million people are trafficked each year and slavery is the third largest illicit market in the world, bringing in an an annual $8-10 billion. This means that the slave market is larger, and there are more slaves in the world today than ever before. This is partly because of how inexpensive slaves are. While the average slave in the American South in 1850 cost around $40,000 (in today's terms), today a slave can be purchased for an average of $90.

These data and much more information come from the organization Free the Slaves! It seeks to raise awareness of and put an end to the practice of slavery. You can find out more information on their website:

http://www.freetheslaves.net/

I have also posted a series of videos (some also from Free the Slaves) on modern slavery on my MySpace page. You can view them through the following link:

http://blogs.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=blog.view&friendId=57920981&blogId=306126010

Shared via AddThis

Reconciling Turkish Identity at a Transitional Moment

Published in Global Connections (Winter 2009)

I had the opportunity to travel to Turkey over the summer to participate in the Council on International Educational Exchange’s (CIEE) faculty development seminar, “Identity, Community, and Culture in Contemporary Turkey.” I went knowing that Turkey is experiencing significant changes, both in terms of its place within the international community and its political dynamics at the domestic level. As someone interested in the roles that regional powers play within their neighborhoods and the processes that lead to alterations in human rights behavior within states, I viewed the visit to Turkey as a tremendous opportunity to get an on-the-ground view of a country that represents both. What I found was that in addition to (and partially because of) these dynamics, Turkey is being forced to reconcile a number of conflictual points about its identity.

Perhaps no single moment captured my entire experience better than one that occurred during the evening that my friends and I sat in a hotel lobby watching the Turkish national football team play in the semi-final game of the European Cup. It was the furthest that Turkey had ever gone in this revered event. And now, Turkey was confronting the powerful German team. We were about a block away from Taksim Square (a central hub in Istanbul), where there was a massive crowd watching the match on enormous screens that were erected for the event. As we wandered around the square earlier, the excitement about this moment was unlike just about any other sporting experience I have had. The fact that Turkey had come this far held a real significance for the throngs that were flooding the area.

The “a-ha moment” came in the middle of the game though, when Turkey scored a goal. The crowd in the square absolutely erupted, and the cheers lasted for quite a while. But just as they finally died down, they were replaced by the call to prayer coming from the nearest mosque. This sacred melody was something that I had become accustomed to over the course of my stay. But this time was a bit different. It was just one of those moments in which everything that had been running around in my mind during this trip seemed to coalesce. The countervailing forces of secular and religious, modern and traditional, European and Islamic identities just seemed to blend together in a way that was harmonious and comfortable.

Throughout my experience, I was struck again and again by how much Turkey finds itself at a crossroads. Given its geographical placement at the intersection between “East and West” as well as “North and South,” this has always been the case, to some extent. But there is a tangible sense that one has in being there, that this is a country that is itself facing a crucial moment. Turkey seems to be filled with a sense of its own potential, but cognizant of its past failures to attain it. It is confronted with serious questions about how best to formulate policy to succeed in becoming an increasingly stable, prosperous, and influential state in the coming years. But along with these questions, something deeper is at stake. As the name of the seminar implied, there seems to be an important reflection period going on in which the very identity of Turkey is being evaluated. And this reflection is occurring in at least three important and interwoven areas: its modern-secular vs. traditional-Islamic orientation, its Middle Eastern vs. European regional placement, and its military-statist vs. liberal democratic operating political philosophy.

The first of these areas of introspection falls along a set of deep and sometimes conflicting identities. On the one hand, since its founding in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Republic of Turkey has been devoutly secular and committed to its inclusion within the community of modern states. There is no doubt that Ataturk wished to break the Turkish nation away from what he perceived as the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire, which included its being the standard bearer of the Islamic Caliphate. The reverence that Turks everywhere genuinely feel for their founding father and their commitment to his vision for their country is obvious. Ataturk’s face is ubiquitous in Turkey. We saw him in the form of his statues, portraits, and his face superimposed over the Turkish flag, just about anywhere we turned.

On the other hand, Turkey is the heart of what was the Ottoman Empire, and a society which is very much rooted in the Islamic faith. There is both a significance to the place and a sense of traditional identification that coexists along with its modern side. I felt this each time I visited a mosque, shrine, or a building that marked the legacy of Ottoman times. I heard this when we spoke to people about the important place that Dervish orders hold in traditional Turkish society. I saw this in the wide range of styles of clothing that I saw particularly women wearing on the streets. Finally, I understood the scope of this identification of Turks by the election of the AKP (an Islamic party) as the governing party of Turkey.

While it is an all-too-common perception in the West that these identities are in pure conflict, it is not entirely clear that they are in Turkey. Is there a tenuous balance between its modern-secular and its traditional-Islamic side? Absolutely. It is this delicate balance that makes the ongoing debate that many of us have heard about over whether or not women should be allowed to wear head scarves on university campuses so volatile. It is this fear that drives many committed to a modern Turkey to vehemently oppose the reintroduction of such symbols of the past. But I must admit that a balance does seem possible when one views it first hand. In fact, it is this delicate balancing act that could prove to be a positive model for other states in which Islamic resurgence is occurring.

This was clear when we met with Haluk Ozdalga, a Minister of Parliament, the Chairman of the Turkish Parliament’s Environment Commission, and a member of the AKP. While a common assumption here might be that an Islamic party would shun the “West” and attempt to cordon off Turkey from Europe, the opposite is true. MP Ozdalga insisted that the environmental improvements that he is leading, and the numerous other changes that Turkey is attempting to make to achieve membership in the European Union are absolutely essential. He believes that EU membership is critical to ensuring that democracy is protected from future returns to the military’s practice of cracking down when it seems to be losing its firm grip on the state, it is essential for the long-term economic and political stability of the Republic, and it is important for Turkey’s maintenance of its critical position within the Transatlantic Community. We asked him how his party reconciled this pro-European position with the accusations that have been made that it was attempting to press an Islamist agenda upon Turkey. His response was quick and firm. “It is an absurd idea that Turkey could ever be a religious state. It has never been in history, and it will never be.”

His words and tone seemed to echo those of so many individuals with whom I came into contact with there. And the thought that I kept coming back to was this. Is this so different from what many democratic societies like our own deal with? The idea that religious identification of individuals is somehow sufficient to be a direct challenge to democracy does not ring true in the United States. Why should it necessarily in Turkey? That Turkey is struggling to find the delicate balance between this set of identities is clear, but so is the fact that such a balance can in fact be struck. Further, the appreciation of the importance of such a balance is a positive sign.

One of the central areas of promise for Turkey in the coming years is its potential for an increasingly prominent role within its several neighboring regions. This issue gives rise to the second key area of Turkey’s introspection. The question of where one should classify Turkey’s geographical and cultural placement is one that dates back over a long period of history. It is also one that is taking on an entirely new resonance as international security dynamics seem to be playing out more and more along regional lines, where certain states (regional powers) have an increasing level of influence. Turkey is a regional power in the Middle East already. It is one of the largest military and economic powers in the region, and it plays a critical function in the management of security issues there. This can be seen recently in its mediation of negotiations between Israel and Syria. It was also apparent in its denial of U.S. forces access to Turkish territory on their way to invade Iraq. But its potential as a regional power does not end with the Middle East. Rather, it holds just such a position within at least two other regions: Central Asia and Europe. Whether or not it provides a sort of push back to the increasing power of Russia within Central Asia is a matter that will determined over a longer period, and will depend on many different factors.

Europe, on the other hand, is very much the focus of some of the most important discussions in Turkey today. Turkey began formal discussions with the European Union on accession as a new member in 2005. It may be common in the U.S. and Western Europe to view Turkey as being situated inside or on the border of the Middle East. But Professor Sevilay Kahraman of the Middle East Technical University told us, “We perceive ourselves as part of the European society - at least since the 19th Century.” She pointed out that at least since it joined NATO, it has been a part of the European security community. The bid for EU membership then, is a way of formalizing its more complete membership within the community that it perceives itself to be a part of. Rather than erasing its identification with other regions though, this is yet another example of the complexity of the Turkish identity.

The Turkish government has taken concerted steps to bring various practices and policies in line with the requirements for EU membership. While it has made significant strides, it clearly has much further to go. Its long-standing conflict over the status of Cyprus (already an EU member), its legacy of human rights abuses, and the powerful role of the military in its government are some of the key stumbling blocks that Turkey has some level of control over. The necessary transformations for EU membership require that Turkey reconcile its geographical place as a European or Middle Eastern state, or some combination thereof. They also necessitate a confrontation with the third area of reflection that it is currently undergoing - that is, what sort of operating political philosophy guides its government. Is it a liberal democracy that values liberty and human rights in the interest of the individual Turkish citizen; or is it a semi-democratic system whose military holds the real power and imposes order when and how it sees fit in the interest of the state? The answer to this question is an essential step toward the EU.

While one cannot possibly underestimate the critical importance of the Cyprus issue, this topic occupied less attention in my discussions in Turkey than others. The role of the military within the government however, was at the forefront of many people’s minds. The AKP was facing the judicial branch this summer on charges that it had violated the Constitution’s establishment of a secular Turkey by moving to allow headscarves on university campuses. This was widely perceived as what was commonly referred to as a “judicial coup.” Instead of overthrowing the government with force, the military was attempting to remove the AKP through legal means.

What was striking was the nearly uniform opposition that we heard to this move, even from those not generally in support of the AKP. It was viewed as threatening to the democratic future of the country. Most of the speculation that was occurring while I was in Turkey was over what the AKP would do if the court ruled against it, or whether the military would accept a ruling in favor of the governing party. The military after all, has a long legacy of overthrowing governments it opposes. But as Professor Elisabeth Ozdalga of the Middle East Technical University told us, there is a sense that the Turkish economy is too integrated with the international community for the military to resort to its old practices. In the end, the AKP was fined but not banned, and the military has indeed not taken any overt action against the government. One could view this as a source of optimism for Turkey’s accession hopes, as well as for the political future of Turkey more generally.

Aside from the military’s general role in government, long-standing human rights practices stand in the way of Turkey being a liberal-democratic, European state. Thus, past and present human rights were the subject of many conversations we had. We met with Dr. Levent Korkut, Director of Amnesty International, Turkey, who cited significant improvements in recent years. The Kurds have been afforded more freedom of cultural and linguistic expression, most heavy forms of torture have been banned, Turkey has ratified all international human rights treaties, and submitted itself to being subject to the European Court of Human Rights. On the other hand, he points out that a number of minorities continue to lack protections against curtailments of their freedoms, laws continue to exist and are enforced that grossly limit freedom of expression, and the Kurds specifically continue to be repressed. Dr. Korkut argues that the Turkish people have never had the opportunity to participate in the construction or selection of a national constitution, and believes that such an exercise, which includes the development of minority protections, is a critical step for the political development of Turkey.

It is likely that such a process would force Turkey to confront not only its contemporary human rights problems, but also those of the past. From the killing of over 200,000 Greeks and the forced displacement of around 1.25 million more from Turkey, to the systematic extermination of as many as 2 million Armenians, Turkey’s early history is stained with violence on a massive scale. Given the fact that people can be prosecuted and have their livelihoods wrecked for insulting “Turkishness”, these are topics that are very difficult to discuss with Turks. And yet, such an honest confrontation with its past would seem to be critical to Turkey’s internal as well as external reconciliation. This step has not happened yet. But we heard indications that it is beginning, including particular attention to the atrocities that were committed against Greeks in the 1922 Smyrna (now Izmir) Massacre. That Turkey’s human rights record and practices require further reconciliation and that this necessitates a confrontation with exactly who the Turkish state is is undeniable. So is the fact that it is gradually doing so in a fairly profound way.

Turkey stands at a unique moment of transition in which there is a great deal of promise. It is emerging upon the international stage with a potential level of influence that it has not enjoyed in centuries. It is engaged in a process that could lead to its finally being recognized as a European peer at a level that has eluded Ottoman and Turkish leaders for a very long time. Such recognition would confirm an important part of the Turks’ self-identity. It would provide validation for the potential coexistence of Islamic society and the modern, secular state. And it would mean the attainment of the democratic promise that has been made to the Turkish people for roughly a century. It is an exciting moment. With continued Turkish perseverance, and openness on the part of Europe, Turkey may just find a balance to its complex and rich set of identities and as a result, attain its tremendous potential.

Ridiculing Restraint: A Dangerous Approach to US Foreign Policy Toward Russia and Other States Category: News and Politics

In the first debate between the contending nominees for the U.S. presidency, Senator John McCain repeatedly chided Senator Barack Obama for immediately urging restraint between both Russia and Georgia during the August military conflict. That Senator Obama also criticized the Kremlin's heavy handed treatment of Georgia in this crisis seemed to be irrelevant given that he had made the cardinal error of calling for a tamping down of violence on both sides. This condemnation of such a plea has motivated me to write this response for two reasons.

First, the fact that we have reached a point at which calls for restraint are met with ridicule is indicative of the twilight zone-like perspective that the U.S. leadership and much of our society has come to accept as reasonable. It is one that lacks understanding or empathy for any perspective than its own. It is one that views the world in sharp dichotomies that automatically place the whims of the U.S. in the category of right, and all others as wrong, or even evil. It is one that forgets that other states (much like the United States) have their own national interests, which they pursue in ways that sometimes conflict with the immediate interests of the U.S. Mainly, it is a perspective that is extreme in its orientation, and is quite dangerous.

Second, it is specifically representative of an alarming downward trajectory in U.S.-Russian relations that result in many respects from the lack of respect that has been shown to Russia as a fellow Great Power over the past two American administrations. This trend is both predictable and manageable. But the United States must begin to come to terms with the fact that Russia is a Great Power, with interests of its own. Some of these interests will provide convenient overlaps with those of the U.S. and its Western allies. In such cases, cooperation should be cultivated. When such overlaps do not exist, the U.S. and its allies should be both resolute and respectful. These two positions are not mutually exclusive - though they seem to be framed as such by hardline elements within the U.S. government. They are rather, diplomacy.

This essay then, seeks to make several points. First, the recent actions of Russia are regrettable, but predictable. They represent what one should expect of a Great Power, given the contemporary strength and behavior of other Great Powers (and particularly that of the United States). They also reflect what one should expect of a Regional Power who has no real regional rival and a history of regional dominance. Second, the post-Cold War and recent policies toward Russia have contributed substantially to Russia's desire to reassert itself within the "near abroad." Third, this is a relationship that can still be managed successfully. However, we must recognize that there will be differences of interest, that in cases that do not threaten core American interests, we will need to give Russia some latitude for action, that we are not entering into a new Cold War, and that there will remain opportunities for cooperation. Finally, the general orientation that is reflected in these points should also guide U.S. policies toward other states, and particularly Great and Regional Powers.

With respect to the first point, the treatment of Georgia by the Russian military in the recent past is certainly to be criticized. Russia was, in its typical fashion, too heavy handed. There was not a need for this, and the rationale used by the Kremlin that claimed an ongoing "cultural genocide" was quite frankly, absurd. That being said, the general actions themselves should not be surprising. Essentially, they reflect two simultaneous and overlapping games that are being played. First, they represent the ongoing reassertion of a Great Power into the global system, given its own recent growth in relative power, the shrinking of (or at least the over-burdened pressures upon) that of United States, and the long-term dynamics between these and other Great Power states. Second, they reflect the assertion of a Regional Power into the unipolar post-Soviet space in a manner that is historically normal, that is consistent with the behavior of other (though not all) Regional Powers within similar contexts, and which was in response to a direct challenge to its commanding position within its region.

Buoyed by petrodollars and the political and economic stabilization that for a time eluded Russia after the end of the Cold War, the Russian government is in a position to once again exert itself back onto the global stage on its own terms. Driven by a resurgence of nationalism and confidence under the leadership of Prime Minister Putin, Russia is in a position that is more reflective of its international role over the past several centuries than either its Superpower status during the Cold War or its subservient position after have been. At the same time, the power and credibility of the United States appears to be in dramatic recession. Its military capacity is stretched to the point at which it lacks a commanding global position to assertively address secondary interests. Its credibility as a leader of a liberal international order has been crippled by its brazen disregard for many of the rules that it has been central in creating: from its unilateral and preventive invasion of Iraq, to its disregard and disdain for the international human rights regime, to its unwillingness to actively address shared international problems such as global climate change. This is combined with the ongoing lack of a willingness by the European powers to take a real politico-military leadership role in international affairs, and the lack of core interests on the part of other Great Powers (China and Japan) in this particular geographical area. It is unsurprising that Russia would take Georgia's bid for the imposition of military control over the autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (areas in which Russia has serious interests, large numbers of citizens, and peacekeeping troops) as an opportunity to flex its muscles.

As a Regional Power within a geographic space that lacks any competitor, it is also unsurprising that Russia would assert its command over other states. Since the recession of the power of the Ottoman Empire within this region, Russia has not been confronted with a peer competitor for leadership in the region. While the formal Soviet Empire may have disappeared, one should not anticipate that so will substantial Russian influence. Nor should one interpret this commanding presence as the reformulation of the Russian or Soviet Empire. This is a behavioral pattern that is consistent with other Regional Powers who lack geographic peers. Through the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and the Roosevelt Corollary addendum in 1904, the U.S. has claimed the Western Hemisphere as its domain to actively impose its interests. In states that include Colombia, Guatemala, Chile, Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico, Haiti, Grenada, and Cuba, the U.S. has intervened with force (covertly or through the overt use of its military) to ensure that its interests are not severely undercut. The North/Central American region in fact, is the most clear-cut case of single state domination that exists in the world today. That Russia would opt to pursue similar methods in regions that represent her core national interests is not simply unsurprising - it is fairly "normal."

The second general point that should be made is that the reassertion of Russian power within its own region is the logical result of the disregard that its interests have been treated with since the end of the Cold War. As Dmitri Simes argues, the American mythology that Ronald Reagan single-handedly (or even primarily) won the Cold War is not only a mischaracterization of this momentous historical event. It is also the root of the U.S. and allies' treatment of Russia as a vanquished enemy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not the point of this essay to go into the wrong-headedness of this common American belief. My concern here is the result, which has been the alienation and humiliation of Russia during the period in which its relative power reached a low point.

In pressing for a radical "shock treatment" to Russia's economy during the 1990s, targeted at bringing it in line with a more pure free market system, the Clinton Administration and its Western partners took a condescending posture toward a state that has been and would again be its peer. The effect of these economic reforms were severe, created a great deal of hardship, and were policies that the Western powers never have and never would adhere to themselves. The expansion of NATO membership (even extending its promise to former Soviet states in the Baltics), the unauthorized military intervention into Kosovo, the beginning of the ongoing push to promote an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea that avoids Russian territory, and the general impression of eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Community's membership and interests with less than sincere concern for what this meant for Russia all demonstrated a high level of disrespect.

Under the Bush administration, this perception of insult has only been compounded. Immediately upon entering office, President Bush unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, calling it a relic (which in no way characterized the Russian view of this agreement). The current administration has pushed for the further expansion of NATO to include the accession of Ukraine and Georgia. It has actively supported the Georgian government's oppositional posture toward Moscow under questionable assertions of its democratic character. It has unwaveringly determined that its National Missile Defense system will be partially based in Poland and the Czech Republic. It disregarded Russia's and the international community's more broadly, opposition to its unilateral invasion of Iraq. It has dragged out negotiations on the inclusion of Russia in the WTO to the point at which such promises seem disingenuous. And it actively supported Kosovar independence from Serbia. That some of these post-Cold War policies may be defended on the grounds that they further U.S. national interests and/or international stability is plausible. What is important for the purposes of the argument here is that each of them has further alienated and insulted Russia as a fellow Great Power.

Both administrations, in other words, consistently demonstrated a lack of restraint in their treatment of a Russia with diminished power. Thus, it is unsurprising that given the opportunity, Russia would assert itself in its own region. Other powers are both incapable and unwilling to deter it. While the West can cry foul all it wants, Russia is not going to be deterred by threats of punitive actions that involve a lack of incorporation into Western institutions. It is already convinced that it is not a real partner with the West. And this is partly thanks to the consistent signals that the West has sent to Russia that have supported such a view. The die is, as they say, cast.

The way to handle this relationship now is not to completely bow to Russia's will. When Russian actions are too extreme or conflict with the interests of the Western alliance, it should be dealt with firmly and with clarity. It should be made clear to Russia which interests are core to the Western allies, and cannot be transgressed. The United States is still the dominant military power in the world, and it stands atop a set of alliances and an international order that does not allow for complete degrees of freedom for Russian actions. Nor would it be in Russia's interest to completely alienate itself from this order or from these states. This must be done though, with a demonstration of respect to Russia as a peer, in a manner that considers its own perspective as one to be negotiated with rather than consistently condemned or disregarded, to demonstrate moderation, and yes - restraint.

Nor must the U.S. and allies sacrifice their interests in promoting democratic governance and increased economic openness throughout Eurasia and beyond. These interests increase the security of not only alliance members, but also the international community more broadly. The way to do this though, is through engagement rather than alienation, inducement rather than insult, and most certainly, example rather than decree. Additionally, this sort of enlargement of the liberal order strategy must be done in a measured way that takes into consideration the perceptions of states like Russia, who interpret such moves as strategies of encirclement and neo-containment. Wild, from-the-gut rhetoric that is derisive of restraint is a catalyst, not a remedy for Russian belligerent nationalism. One could in fact argue that it represents a dangerous appeal to American belligerent nationalism.

In addition to dealing with Russia and its neighbors with a heightened degree of prudence, the United States must make concerted efforts to rectify the untold damage to the relationships that have been the bedrock of American foreign policy in the post-World War II era as well as to its legitimacy as a global leader of a liberal order. While these are subjects for a whole separate essay, they are critical to the future of relations between Russia and the West. It is NATO that will be the most important bulwark against Russian hostility in the future. The United States must act proactively to nurture the all-important relationships that make up this alliance. It cannot simply expect that the European powers will simply fall into line when Washington demands. The time to remedy this situation is now, and the means through which to do so are through a less militaristic and hawkish tone. European powers, like Russia, should be accorded the respect that they deserve as partners, not subordinates. Additionally, the U.S. needs to practice what it preaches. If it wishes to continue to utilize the liberal order that it has actively expanded since the Second World War, and which has widened international security, it must begin to play by its own rules. It is for instance, laughable to hear Vice-President Cheney go to Ukraine and criticize Russia's increasingly repressive regime. He is in no position. And this fact is not lost on the rest of the world.

Finally, the contours of the revised approach that I propose here for U.S. relations with Russia are applicable beyond. The United States must begin to treat other Great Powers with the respect that they deserve if it hopes to elicit their cooperation in dealing with many of the common problems that we face: from international terrorism to nuclear proliferation to global climate change. It must also recognize that the world is now structured in a way that requires increasingly cooperative relationships with Regional Powers who often have a greater interest in and influence upon addressing economic and security problems that arise within their neighborhoods. Even when dealing with smaller states, over whom Washington has a greater degree of leverage, it would do well to be more measured than it has become. Rather than ridiculing calls for restraint, the United States should encourage others to show it. More than this, the U.S. must incorporate a higher degree of restraint in its own behavior if it hopes to pursue its national interests successfully.

The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal and Nuclear Disarmament Category: News and Politics

I received an email yesterday that called on all Americans to write to their representatives to tell them that they should oppose the US-Indian Nuclear Deal that President Bush and Prime Minister Singh agreed to in 2005. I sent a response that indicated that I disagree with the move to oppose this deal. In fact, I consider the deal to be a wise move for the United States. I also indicated though, that while in the short term this seems to be a good course of action, we should actively move toward nuclear disarmament as a longer term strategy. Such a strategy would not only include the U.S. and India, and all existing and would-be nuclear powers. I thought that I would include my reasoning for these positions as I wrote them in my reply as my newest blog...

This is one policy that I actively support President Bush on. It is not that I do not recognize the validity of many of the point's made by those who oppose the deal It is indeed a slippery slope, which increases the acceptance of the number of nuclear powers in the world. It also "rewards bad behavior" for a state who violated international norms against the proliferation of nuclear weapons (though it should be noted that they were not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that would have banned them from doing so). And it certainly does put us in an increasingly awkward position in arguing that states like Iran and North Korea cannot develop nuclear weapons themselves.

That being said, it is the right policy for the following reasons:

1. India has been a nuclear power since the 1970s. We cannot turn back the clock and wish this were not so. It is the status quo, and we have to deal with it.

2. Pakistan is too, and is India's perennial rival. To not have a nuclear deterrent while Pakistan does would be strategically unwise for India (one could make the same case for Iran with respect to Israel, I know).

3. As the power of China and Russia grows along with tensions between the US and these powers, as do a variety of other destabilizing trends in the regions of South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East (all of which India is in proximity to), we need India as a strategic partner. We have more shared values (India is the world's largest democracy) with them than many of their neighbors. They will increasingly be an important ally in a highly problematic part of the world in coming years, and we should be treating them as such right now. This policy does that.

4. India will soon join the club of Great Powers. Membership in this club by and large carries with it the allowance for nuclear weapons. The exceptions are Germany and Japan (who both are provided with a nuclear umbrella by the US). It would be unfair to deny India this prerogative as well. Again, right or wrong, this is the way the world functions right now. We cannot expect that India or any other state of its size and growing power will accept the disrespect that comes from
denying them recognition for what they are. Such would also alienate them, which we have already done enough of to others.

5. We can have more influence over India's nuclear weapons as partners, rather than competitors.

6. As long as this is the game that we find ourselves in, we must play it - at least in the near term. If we wish to change the game (as I avidly support doing), we should not begin by attempting to turn back the clock on or alienating India. We should bring together all of the nuclear powers in the world as well as those states who seek to become nuclear powers. We should create a contemporary agreement that does not accept a double standard between those who have nuclear weapons and those who do not.

We should eliminate nuclear weapons completely. They create a ticking time bomb scenario that eventually will destroy entire nations and perhaps all of humanity. This not a hyperbole or scare mongering. It is the logical outcome of the direction that we are headed, and we are
frankly fortunate that it has not happened already.

If we wish to secure ourselves as well as humanity, we should begin to act like the Superpower that we are. We should provide leadership in drafting this agreement, and getting other states (allies and foes alike) on board. dismantling of our own nuclear arsenal. We have by far the largest, and therefore this would be a show of good faith. We should not complete the process until we verify that we and others are remaining on a pre-scheduled time table that does not create an asymmetric scenario in which we or others are insecure and then back out.

I am not alone in the general view that nuclear weapons must be eliminated. Henry Kissinger, Robert McNamara, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and Goerge Schultz all agree with me. They represent the elite of the military-political establishment from the Cold War on both sides of the
aisle.

The alienation of India, or at least the resistance to developing closer working relationships with it, is a self-defeating policy idea that is motivated by otherwise good intentions. Support the deal with India, and push for nuclear disarmament!